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BŁAEJ SOCHA 
The Agency Problem in the Merger of Vistula & Wólczanka Ltd. 
and W. Kruk Ltd. 
Abstract 
The article discusses the behavior of company bodies and possible 
conflicts of interests occurring among them during company takeover. In this 
context, the insider management model, popular in Poland, is discussed. 
Its implications have been presented using the example of the merger between 
Vistula & Wólczanka Ltd. and W. Kruk Ltd. 
1. Introduction 
In classic economic theory, the enterprise is identified with the 
entrepreneur, who performs the key functions of ownership and management of 
production factors. The market economy of developed countries proves this 
theory to be wrong, especially in big companies, due to the separation of 
management and ownership functions. Shareholders who provide capital, hire 
managers whose task is to run the company. Separating ownership from 
management may be explained as an effective form of economic cooperation 
within contracts in the enterprise (Fama 1980, p. 289). The agency problem 
describes the relations in this kind of a company. 
The mentioned theory is also very helpful when explaining the relations 
and behavior in the face company takeover. A deteriorating economic situation 
in the world increases the probability of takeover transactions. Subjects with 
a strong eco-financial position may use the period of low stock-exchange 
quotations of their competitors or of companies which complement their market 
offer, and attempt to takeover such entities. 
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The aim of the article is to explain the relations between managers and 
shareholders in possible takeover situations. The first part of the article, being 
the base for further analysis, discusses the agency problem concept and essence, 
along with its evolution. The second part outlines conflicts of interests that may 
occur in the takeover bid. It also provides basic information on the techniques 
used by managers to defend companies against takeovers. The last point contains  
a description of the 2008 takeover of W. Kruk Ltd. by Vistula & Wólczanka 
Ltd., with particular attention paid to the emerging conflicts and defense 
methods used in this process. 
2. The Agency Problem  
The concept of agency problem emerged at the turn of the 60s and 70s of 
the last century. Initially, literature on the subject focused on the issue of 
business activity risk distribution. Attention was also paid to the variety of 
approaches to risk, characteristic for particular parties connected with the 
business. Later, the problem of the agent was introduced from the delegation of 
management of economic entities. The agency problem had been developed 
primarily by M. Jensen, M. Meckling and E. Fama
51
. 
According to this theory, the company is perceived as a bunch of contracts 
connected with production factors. The parties involved in each contract are 
motivated by their personal interests, however they have to be aware of the 
threat of such behavior. The realization and duration of their contract is also 
dependent on the success of other contracts within the entity (Fama 1980, 
p. 289). Such an approach is fully grounded. A company is a very complex unit 
and it is necessary to achieve goals in all areas of activity to be able to compete 
with other entities. The most important contracts in an earning organization are 
those, which regulate in particular: 1) the claims of shareholders (capital givers) 
and 2) the allocation of the decision-making process. Such a contract 
differentiates a given company from other entities functioning within the sector 
and explain why this form of organization allows the company to survive and 
compete on the market (Fama, Jensen 1983b, p. 302).
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The agency problem concentrates on explaining the dependencies within 
the central contract. By a contract one of the parties (the principal) delegates 
decision-making powers to the other party (the agent), who provides labor to the 
principal (Ekanayake 2004, p. 49). Due to different objectives of the principal and 
the agent, and the opportunistic approach of the latter, a conflict of interests 
appears; it is called the agent problem. The parties also present different 
approaches towards risk. Capital givers expect an increase of invested capital 
and they have to take investment risk into account, however they have 
possibilities to diversify their investments. For managers, in turn, the contract is 
usually a single, non-diversified income source, so their approach is that of risk 
aversion.  
Analyzing the conflict of the contract parties' aspirations outlined above, 
one might question if it would not be more effective to give the roles of 
management and ownership to one entity, as it is done in the classic economic 
theory. Although there is no perfect answer to such a question, the analysis of 
developed capital markets indicates existing grounds for separating these 
functions. As early as 1924, Veblen claimed that capitalists were interested 
in creating shortages through monopolization, while engineers would set 
technical efficiency and internal growth as their goal (Veblen 2001, p. 45). 
Investors are keen on employing managers, whom they treat as highly 
specialized human capital to generate principal repayment. Managers, in turn, 
are unable to do without capital of the investors, necessary for current activity 
and development (Shleifer, Vishny 1997, p. 740). 
It is worth pointing out that the contract concluded between the principal 
and the agent is asymmetrical (Urbanek 2005, p. 49). It mainly concerns access 
to information. An agent who runs the company has a wider spectrum of 
information on the eco-financial situation of the entity, and may use it, within 
legal boundaries, to have an advantage over shareholders. A principal, who has 
access to fragmentary information passed on by the agent may make wrong 
decisions and draw wrong conclusions. 
The role of the agency problem is, among others, to provide 
recommendations as how to compensate the conflict of interests mentioned 
above and the informational asymmetry occurring between the contract parties. 
Among the most important mechanisms, one should include the contract 
mechanism and direct monitoring (Urbanek 2005, pp. 54-58). 
The contract mechanism means concluding an agreement between the 
principal and the agent, which regulates the most important issues concerning 
the direction of the activity and the rules governing the use of the achieved 
financial results. An optimal situation from the principal's perspective would be 
the inclusion of agent behavior scenarios into the contract. However, this is not 
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possible due to the difficulty to describe and foresee future economic events 
(Shleifer, Vishny 1997, p. 74). An important element of the contract is risk 
distribution between the parties. Most often, it is carried out by means of the 
manager's rewarding system.  
The aim of direct monitoring is to provide the principal with information 
on the actions and behaviors of the agent. Information is delivered via an 
information system, which may include budgeting procedures, a reporting 
system etc (Urbanek 2005, p. 56). However, mechanisms mitigating the conflict 
of interests and informational asymmetry mean additional expenses. Therefore, 
these mechanisms should be formulated and used in such a way that their overall 
cost would not be bigger than the probable missed opportunities which would 
arise for the principal as a result of the opportunistic approach of the agent. 
An important factor influencing the behavior of the contract parties is the 
stake structure of the given subject. One may observe the following relations 
(Demsetz 1983, p. 375): 
• Larger defragmentation of the owner's capital gives managers more freedom 
in their actions, 
• Not every shareholder is able or willing to control company management, 
however those shareholders, in extreme cases, assume that there is one who 
owns a block of shares allowing him/her to control managers 
- in professional literature this phenomenon is known as the free ride 
problem. 
The agency problem and company expenditure connected with it appear 
only in case of separating management from ownership. If the company manager 
is its only owner, the problem does not occur. 
3. Mergers and Hostile Takeovers in the Light of the Agency Problem 
The merger and takeover mechanism is a convenient background for the 
agent-principal relation. That is because in a company subject to a takeover or 
merger, conflicts often occur between its managers and shareholders. In such 
a case, it is also easier to observe the costs of the conflict for the company. 
The aim of the merger and takeover processes is to gain control over the 
enterprise. Possessing the controlling block of shares enables one to obtain, apart 
from property and rights ascribed to every share, decision-making powers, to 
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which the ordinary or qualified majority is entitled
52
. Controlling block of shares 
ownership creates additional benefits and enables the owner to carry out 
organizational changes in the controlled entity.  
The shareholders of the company being subject to a takeover bid should 
be given an opportunity to consider such proposals. This is because as long as 
they may diversify their investment on the capital market, they may view the 
takeover bid as profitable. From their point of view, it may also be seen as 
a solution to the owner - manager problem. This happens when the agent of the 
overtaking company seems to be a person more competent and efficient with 
higher target figures than the previous agent.  
Managers of the company subject of the takeover bid in most cases have 
different goals than shareholders. Usually, they try to prevent the takeover. 
It results, first and foremost, from the above-discussed aversion to risk and fear 
of position loss. Managers usually try to convince shareholders that the bid 
provided by the bidder is inadequate. Such opinions are difficult to verify, due to 
the fact that company value is a subjective category; it is hard to confirm or deny 
this sort of statement on the part of the agent (Walking, Long 1984, p. 55). 
Agents’ statement declaring the bid offer to be underpriced does not 
generate costs for the company, managers often use protective techniques which 
may mean considerable costs. The most frequent defense techniques against 
takeovers include (Gajdka, Stos 2004, pp. 200-202):
1.Staggered board; 
2.Super majority provisions; 
3.Fair price requirement; 
4.Poison pill; 
5.Dual-class recapitalization; 
6.Targeted repurchase; 
7.White knight; 
8.Restructurization of assets; 
9.Restructurization of liabilities; 
10. Court proceedings. 
Techniques 1-5 require adequate legal notations and have to be 
implemented before the possible takeover attempt. Their aim is to discourage the 
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potential overtaking entity. The most popular technique is the poison pill. 
Its task is to prevent or hinder the takeover by a dramatic increase of costs, 
which the overtaking entity would have to bear (Davis 1991, p. 584). Most 
frequently, the purpose is achieved by means of new sharesemission for current 
shareholders with considerable discounts. 
Techniques 6-7 are used when the takeover has been attempted. It usually 
is a bid addressed to one or several particular investors whom managers regard 
as friendly towards them and company strategy. The restructurization of assets 
means selling those assets which the overtaking entity wants most, while 
changes in liabilities may concern shares' repurchase for their remission. 
Earlier research, carried out to verify the agency problem, done on 
mergers and takeovers, proved the following dependencies (Walking, Long 
1984, p. 55; Argaval, Mendelker 1987, pp. 823-837): 
• Companies where managers objected to the takeover had worse financial 
results before the takeover attempt, 
• Manager's resistance is the key factor which determines the takeover 
expenditure, 
• Managers being in possession of a considerable amount of shares object less 
to the takeover attempt. 
These relations, despite a positive verification on the American capital 
market cannot be uncritically applied to the European market reality. This stems, 
firstly, from different views on the functions of the controlling bodies. Much as 
on the American market they are to represent the interests of shareholders, the 
supervisory board in European companies focuses mainly on the good of the 
company, which should presumably reflect the shareholders' interest (Lis, 
Sterniczuk 2005, p. 45). Secondly, the presented agency problem proves itself in 
companies where the functions of ownership and management are separated 
(outsider model). In case of the insider model, where one or a few dominant 
shareholders also perform managerial functions, the relationships within the 
contract are not as straightforward as in the outsider model. 
If a shareholder is uncertain whether his/her interests are represented 
properly in the company, he/she may introduce a representative into the 
supervisory board. Such a shareholder (insider) has the task to provide capital 
for the company, as well as control the entity. Performing both these functions 
by one entity makes it difficult to ascribe the role of a principal to such an 
investor, since his/her behavior as a board member may be one of an agent. 
Providing security for dominant shareholders, visible in the insider model, 
may contradict the good of the minority shareholders. If the benefits gained by 
the insider from performing the controlling function are relatively bigger than 
those resulting from property rights, the decisions made by this person may be 
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viewed by others as ungrounded or harmful. The possibility of such a situation 
shows the need to protect minority shareholders against the dominant position of 
the insiders. 
4. Vistula & Wólczanka Ltd. and W. Kruk Ltd. Merger vs. the Agent 
Problem 
The Vistula & Wólczanka Limited liability company came to being in 
2006, as a result of a merger between Vistula Ltd. and Wólczanka Ltd. Its area 
of activity is production and sales of men's and women's wear, as well as 
distribution of global brands. In its portfolio, the company has brands recognized 
and valued on the Polish market: Vistula, Wólczanka, Letterfeld and Andre 
Renauld. Figure 1. presents the company stakeholders before the merger. 
It consists mostly of financial investors, while about a half of the stakeholders 
were entities with less than 5% of the share capital. 
Figure 1. Ownership structure of Vistula & Wólczanka share capital, 15.05.2008 
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Source: own study, based on www.vistula.pl. 
W. Kruk Ltd. is one of the oldest jewelers on the Polish market. 
Its founders were the predecessors of Wojciech Kruk the current majority 
shareholder of the company. Its area of activity focuses on production, 
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manufacturing and distribution of jewellery and distribution of watches.  
The entities dependent on the company are: Jubilart Ltd. and DCG Ltd. 
The main shareholder of the company and the head of its board of directors was 
Wojciech Kruk. There were also several institutional shareholders. 
Figure 2. Ownership structure of W. Kruk LTD. share capital, 15.05.2008 
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Source: own study, based on www.wkruk.pl. 
On May 5, 2008, Vistula & Wólczanka announced a bid call for W. Kruk 
Ltd. shares, with a subscription period from May 14 to May 27. The aim of 
V&W was to purchase the counterfoil share block comprising from 51% to 66% 
of the total number of votes at the shareholders’ general meeting. 
The announced takeover attempt resulted from V&W investment strategy, which 
assumed creating a capital group which would concentrate entities dealing with 
retail sales in the premium segment. According to the V&W management board, 
the merger would especially reduce operating costs of network, logistics 
management and expenses for administration. It would also enable  synergy 
between the target groups of particular brands
53
. 
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The V&W board bid the price of 23.70 PLN per share According to legal 
regulations, the minimum possible bid price was 23.50 PLN per share
54
. At the 
same time, a falling tendency of W.Kruk Ltd. share value was observed (see 
Figure 3). In the light of the above, the bid was considered as moderate.  
Figure 3. Share quotations of W. Kruk LTD. in six months prior to the call 
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Source: own study. 
In response to the bid call, the management board of W. Kruk Ltd. issued  
a statement in which share investors were not recommended to sell the shares in 
the V&W call for bid. In the statement, attention was drawn primarily to the 
following: 
• The fact of takeover premium pretermission, 
• Very limited management cost reduction opportunities due to dispersed 
localizations of entities, 
• Threat to the development strategy adopted by W.Kruk, 
• The risk of breach of contract by business partners in the event of Wojciech 
Kruk leaving the company. 
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The standpoint of Wojciech Kruk, performing the function of the Head of 
the supervisory board was analogical to the statement of the board of directors. 
A representative of one of W. Kruk’s institutional investors, Millenium 
TFI, had a positive view on the possible merger of the entities. In his opinion, 
the goods offered by the companies were to some extent complementary and 
aiming at similar target groups (Laskowska 2008, pp. 3-4). Other W. Kruk 
financial investors would not comment the call, excusing themselves with 
a professional secret.  
The V&W bid became even more attractive on 23.05.2008, when the 
company board announced raising the price by nearly 3.5% - up to 24.50 PLN 
per share. As seen on figure 4, the bid was higher than W. Kruk quotations from 
the call period. 
Figure 4. Share quotations of W. Kruk LTD. between 05.05.2008 and 23.05.2008 
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Source: own study. 
The action scheme of W. Kruk managers and shareholders may be 
represented by the agency problem mechanisms. 
The board of directors, for which risk and fear aversion for the loss of 
personal gains is a typical characteristic feature, recommends rejecting the bid of 
V&W investors. It is difficult to unambiguously assess the V&W bid drawbacks 
presented by the Board of W.Kruk. It seems that the objection concerning the 
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pretermission of the takeover premium should be discussed from the 
shareholders’ not managers’ point of view. The raised bid price offered by 
V&W was 3.4% higher than the highest quotation of the company from the bid 
period. A dispersed localization of the companies does not hinder probable 
administrative cost reduction. After the possible merger, company headquarters 
may be moved to one of the premises. The danger concerning the breach of 
contracts, which are strategic for W. Kruk, in the event of a change of stake, 
included in the board statement, should not arise if we consider the absence of 
such remarks in the earlier periodical financial reports of the company. 
The doubtful valuation of W. Kruk does not change the fact, however, that the 
reaction of the board was a good example of the agent’s behavior. 
It is more difficult to analyze the approach of the main shareholder of the  
W. Kruk company – Wojciech Kruk. As a shareholder and control person in the 
company, his probable intention was to maximize personal benefits
55
. Wojciech 
Kruk’s negative opinion indicates that the usefulness of performing the 
controlling function was greater than the usefulness of being a shareholder. 
Evidence supporting the thesis might be the level of Wojciech Kruk’s fee for 
performing the function of the head of the supervisory board. In 2007 it 
amounted to 976 000 PLN, while in the first half of 2008 – 519 000 PLN
56
. For 
comparison, the salary of the other members of the board was  24 000 PLN in 
2007 and 12 000 PLN in the first half of 2008. The real threat of losing control 
over the company founded and developed by Wojciech Kruk’s ancestors was not 
without meaning as well. These circumstances caused Wojciech Kruk to behave 
like an agent. 
Other shareholders, playing the role of the principal in the company in 
accordance with the agency problem, analyzed the V&W bid in terms of benefits 
which might be drawn from 1) downturning the possible investment 2) company 
development in the capital group. One cannot asses the shareholder’s attitudes in 
one way because of their individual preferences, however attention should be 
paid to two facts: first of all the falling tendency on the stock market, and 
consequently the need of massive bond redemption by investment found groups, 
could make the V&W bid a good opportunity to partly withdraw from or quit the 
investment, with the price level higher than the stock- quotations. Secondly, the 
shares of W.Kruk were characterized by low fluency. Therefore, one might 
assume that the call bid was favorable, especially for investors.  
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The recommendation given in the statements of W.Kruk Board of 
Directors and W. Kruk himself might have been insufficient to convince 
investors not to sell their shares. For defense against takeover, discouraging 
techniques should have been used, for the V&W board to withdraw. The only 
protective mechanism applied earlier was a notation in the W. Kruk statute. 
According to its content, Wojciech Kruk and his family were given power to 
assign two members of the supervisory board as long as their involvement was 
above 25% of the share capital
57
. The statute would also grant powers for 
Wojciech Kruk to appoint the head of the supervisory board for as long as his 
share does not fall below 10%. Therefore, if the bid had been carried out without 
the Kruk family consent, they would still have two seats guaranteed in the 
company’s supervisory board. 
The declarations of Wojciech Kruk, being evidence of his talks with 
investors for the purpose of takeover prevention, were not fulfilled. The first 
sign of capitulation was early company annual report publishing. Such actions 
allowed for shortening the closed period
58
.  Having published the report, the 
board members were able to freely dispose of the shares in their possession. 
Lastly, on 26.05.2008, Wojciech Kruk declared a significant reduction of his 
involvement in the company. 
The decision for Wojciech Kruk to accept the bid was most probably 
caused by two factors: Firstly, defense against takeover would require huge 
expenses. One of the probable scenarios, considerably hindering the process 
would be the purchase of about 10% of the company shares. The Kruk family 
would then possess a block of about 40% of the total share and the takeover 
would have been significantly hindered.  However, such transactions would 
require spending about 40 million PLN, which he would have to obtain within 
a short period of time. Secondly, a huge chance for company control loss in the 
event of a takeover carried out without Wojciech Kruk’s consent. Despite two 
seats in the board, guaranteed by statute, Wojciech Kruk would lose benefits 
driven from performing the function (such as an exceptional salary). 
The call to sell the shares of W.Kruk announced by V&W was realized. 
Shareholders who disposed of more than two thirds of capital of the company 
responded to it. The General Assembly of shareholders decided to take the 
whole property of W.Kruk and change the name of the company into “Vistula 
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58 See: Art. 156 of the 29 July 2005 Bill on financial instruments circulation (Dz.U. 2005 nr 
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Group S.A.” In connection with the fusion from 30
th
 December 2008 the 
quotation of W.Kruk on Warsaw Stock Exchange were stopped. 
5. Conclusion 
The separation of the management function and property in the company 
is obvious in the conditions of a well-developed capital market. In order to 
understand the relations between these areas it is necessary to know the relations 
between them.  
The agency problem is one of the most influential theories that describe 
this range of activity of the company. Its adequacy was verified mainly on the 
basis of the American market, where the function of management and property 
is in the majority of cases divided.  
The analysis of the fusion of Vistula&Wólczanka Ltd. with W.Kruk Ltd. 
was to signalize the possibilities to use the agency problem in companies with 
the so called insider shareholders and to present the mechanisms which takes 
place during the takeover. The behaviors of insiders are difficult to verify. 
Depending on the usefulness and benefits they bring they can act both as the 
agent and the principal. The role of the insider can be very influential in the 
context of success or failure or the costs of the possible takeover or fusion. 
Although the usefulness of the agency problem was proved in the description of 
the corporation behaviors, one can formulate some objections. The most 
important is the separation of the theory from the social context of management. 
Such factors like the labor market and goods and the problem of the ethic 
behaviors of the managers are not taken into consideration. 
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